Ring hash structure is a new hash structure which has been introduced by Joux to strengthen the current hash structures against multi-collision attacks. In this paper, we present a cryptanalysis on Ring hash structure. We show that finding multi-collisions, i.e. 2 k -way collision, for a Ring hash structure is not much harder than finding such multi-collisions for ordinary MD hash structure. The complexity of our attack is approximately ( ) log n times harder than the complexity of attacks against MD structures. We employ these multi-collisions to find a D-way pre-image for this structure. We show the complexity of finding 2 respectively. We also show that Ring structure should not be used to create a hash function of 2n-bit length, by concatenating this structure to any other hash structure of n-bit output length. We show that the time complexity of finding a collision for this concatenated structure is
( )
log n times harder than the complexity of attacks against MD structures. We employ these multi-collisions to find a D-way pre-image for this structure. We show the complexity of finding 2 respectively. We also show that Ring structure should not be used to create a hash function of 2n-bit length, by concatenating this structure to any other hash structure of n-bit output length. We show that the time complexity of finding a collision for this concatenated structure is 
INTRODUCTION
Hash functions are used widely as a cryptographic primitive for generating digital signatures and message authentication codes. Each cryptographic hash functions should satisfy some security criteria. The main security requirement for a hash function is its collision freeness. Informally, it means that no attacker should be able to find a pair of different messages M and M' leading to equal hash values. Moreover, hash functions with output block length smaller than 160 bits are nowadays considered as insecure, due to general birthday attack.
In practice, building a cryptographic function with an input of variable size is not a simple task. Most hash functions are based on an iterated construction that makes use of a compression function, whose inputs have fixed sizes. A wellknown family of such a construction are MDx hash function family, including MD4 , MD5 (Rivest, 1995) , and SHA (FIPS 180-1, 1995) . The principle behind this structure is that if there is a computationally collision-free function f from m bits to n bits, where n < m (Damgard, 1990) then there is a collision-free hash function h mapping a message of arbitrary polynomial length to a k-bit string. Due to Merkle-Damg°ard theorem, it is claimed that if IV is fixed and if the padding procedure includes the length of the input into the padding bits, then h is collision-resistant if f is collision-resistant (Damgard, 1990 , Merkle, 1990 . Hence, it has been generally thought that the problem of designing a collision-resistant hash function has been reduced to the problem of designing a collision-resistant compression function. However, the multi-collision attack (Joux, 2004) and the multi-block differential collision attack on MD5, SHA-0 and SHA-1 (Biham, 2005 , Wang, Yin, 2005 indicates that a collision-resistant compression function is not a sufficient condition of a collision-resistant hash function, but only a necessary condition. It means that a secure and collision-resistant hash function will be based not only on a collision-resistant compression function, but also on a collisionresistant structure.
Attacks to Hash function can divide in two groups. First group, e.g. Wang Attack (Wang, Yin, 2005, Wang, Yu, 200) , includes attacks that use weaknesses of compression function. Second group of attacks, e.g. Joux (Joux, 2004) attack, includes attacks that use weaknesses of iterative structures, which are generic attacks to iterative structures such as MD structure. Actually, in this attack, increasing the security of compression function does not lead to strengthen the structure against multi-collision attack. Figure 1 .
After introducing this attack, many structure have been proposed to strength iterated structure against this type of attach such Ring hash (Su, 2006) 3C and 3C+ (Gauravaram, 2006) , Zipper hash (Liskov, 2006) , WPH and DPH (Lucks, 2005) , L-pipe (Speirs, 2007) , etc. All this structure tries to strength against multi-collision or multi-block attack. Among this new hash structure, in our investigation, we analysis strengthen of Ring hash (Su, 2006) against multicollision attack. This paper is organized as following. Section 2 is a brief description of Ring hash function. Section 3 describes our attack for finding multi-collision for this structure. In section 4, we present a preimage attack for this structure. Section 5 present the security of 2n-bit Ring based hash function. Conclusions will be presented in section 6.
RING HASH STRUCTURE
There is two different variant of ring hash structure, called Single-feedback ring hash (SFRH) and multi-feedback ring hash (MFRH). The Ring hash structure can be considered as a general hash function construction. To build an n-bit hash function, it needs a compression functions f and an IV as initial chaining value. The function f can be seen as { } { } 0,10,1 nmn + ® mapping with nm £ where m is single message block length and n is hash value out put length. Surprisingly, for his structure if original message length is division of m padding will be neglected (Su, 2006) , but if we consider a standard way of padding, it will not affect proposed attack. In standard padding schemas with function P(x), for input x it is guaranteed to return a padded value such that P(x) is a string that can be broken down into m-bit length blocks, and for all 
MULTI-COLLISION ATTACK ON RING HASH
Ring hash structure has developed as a structure that could strength multi-collision attack. In this section, we show that constructing multi-collisions in Ring hash function can be done in an efficient way. If we consider collisions between messages of the same length, in this case the blocks of padding are identical and the padding process can be ignored. Moreover, if the intermediate hash chaining values collide at some point in the hash computation of two messages, the following values remain equal as while as the reminder of the messages are identical. Thus, on messages of the same length, collisions without the padding clearly lead to collisions with the padding.
Although this attack could be apply for any length of message block and chaining value, but for simplicity of prove, we assume that the size of the message blocks is bigger than the size of the chaining values. However, the attack can be easily generalized to the other case. We also assume that we can access two collision finding machines C and ' C . C is a machine that given as input a chaining value h outputs two different blocks M and '
This collision finding machine may use the generic birthday attack or any specific attack based on a weakness of f . The most relevant property is that C should work properly for all chaining values. It's clear that most of these assumed conditions for our scenario are similar to what considered in ( Joux, 2004) 
3-1 Multi-Collision Attack on SFRH

3-2 Multi-Collision Attack on MFRH
FINDING K-WAY SECOND-PREIMAGE ATTACK ON RING HASH
In reference (Joux, 2004) Joux puts forward an attack method called k-way second-preimage which is applicable for finding the second preimage of an output of a hash function based on the MD structure.
For 
4-1 Finding k-Way Second-Preimage Attack on SFRH
For a hash function based on the SFRH structure, we show that adversary can find 2 r -way preimage and second preimage in cost of ( ) 
RING HASH IN 2N-BITE CONCATENATED STRUCTURE
A natural construction to build large hash values is to concatenate several smaller hashes. For example, given two hash functions F and G, it seems reasonable given a message M to form the large hash
In this construction, F and G can either be two completely different hash functions or two slightly different instances of the same hash function. In (Joux, 2004) Joux has shown that if at least one of these hash function be a MD iterated hash function, complexity of finding a collision for this structure is slightly more than finding collision for one branch and equal to ( ) 
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we showed that finding multicollisions in Ring hash structure are not much harder to find than finding multi-collisions in MD hash structure. Actually, we proved that finding multi-collisions in SFRH is as difficult as finding it on ordinary MD, and for MFRH, it is a little harder than what for MD is. Also, we have shown that finding 2 r -way preimages and second preimages on these structures are not really harder to find than ordinary preimages and second preimages. Moreover, we shown that ring hash structures can not be used as a building block for creating 2n-bite concatenated hash structure because of its strength against collision attack, which is much less than ideal one. Our study have shown that although this structure is slightly more secure than MD iterated hash structure, but is really far from perfect hash function.
